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BOOK REVIEW
LAW AND PSYCHOLOGY IN CONFLICT. By JAMES MAR-
SHALL. New York-Kansas City: Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1966.
Pp. 119. $5.95.
The author of Law and Psychology in Conflict, Mr. James Mar-
shall, is a successful and respected member of the New York Bar.
Constitutional law experts may remember him for his successful rep-
resentation of the NAACP in the second of the "Texas primary elec-
tion cases" (Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45). His skills are not
merely those of advocacy. He has been an Adjunct Professor of Law
at New York University, has been the president of the New York
City Board of Education, and has written several books and articles
on political philosophy. Mr. Marshall is a successful blend of bril-
liance, scholarship, and specialized skill as a lawyer-craftsman. In his
maturity he has developed a broad .sense of social concern and
forward-looking civic mindedness. Consequently, he appears to have
transcended the myopic tunnel-vision which so often limits the man of
narrow specialization. Mr. Marshall's viewpoint has not become fixed
in the professional concrete of stereotyped practice. He appears to
have achieved an expanded consciousness of interdisciplinary re-
sources available to men of the law. He describes with real under-
standing some of the many dimensions in which an interface between
psychology and the law is possible. Through his engaging little book
(it is a mere 119 pages) he shares with us some of the vista of
possibilities his multidimensional viewpoint has encompassed.
Despite the limited content of his book, it is a significant statement
of an interesting and pertinent thesis. It deserves a thoughtful reading
by any forward looking lawyer or jurist interested in this field. Its
footnote references are generous and thorough, and Mr. Marshall's
style generally makes for easy reading.
Despite the title of his book, Mr. Marshall actually seems to make
less of a case for the existence of a conflict between law and psy-
chology than he does for the existence of a lack of involved awareness
about the usefulness of psychological data on the part of many
lawyers, judges, or law professors. The first part of his monograph
is dedicated to an expositive summary of the facts known about the
perceptive process as it effects testimonial evidence. He implies this
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area of psychological knowledge is unfortunately ignored by lawyers
and jurists. If this "ignoring" of psychiatry-psychology were the
result of inadequately developed knowledge, or if the viewpoints of
the psychiatrists-psychologists were too theoretically divergent from
the lawyer's to permit notice, it would be one thing. But if the ignor-
ing is in the more general sense of the word ignorance, it is another
proposition entirely.
Mr. Marshall's little book may be a harbinger of eventual changes
to come. New collaborative efforts are being made by lawyers,
psychoanalytical psychiatrists, and psychologists to achieve under-
standing by studying and challenging the experiences, assumptions,
and knowledge of their different disciplines. New learned treatises
appear and old favorites are revised. For example, the Free Press of
Glencoe has recently released a new book interpreting psychiatry and
psychoanalysis to lawyers. This book, entitled Psychoanalysis, Psy-
chiatry, and the Law, was written by Katz, Goldstein and Dersho-
witz. Henry Davidson's book, Forensic Psychiatry, has now been
revised and expanded in its second edition in an attempt to interpret
law more effectively to psychiatrists. It seems clear that, as a group,
psychiatrists are generally as ignorant of the law as the lawyer is of
psychology and psychiatry.
Mr. Marshall correctly contends that there is a body of knowledge
now available to the law which it should use, and that the time is
overdone for American lawyers and social scientists to inaugurate a
series of joint discussions and research projects with the ultimate
goal of correcting the game of "make believe" which Mr. Marshall
charges is inherent in the adversary system of trial law. He advances
a good deal of evidence in support of his first proposition that re-
peated, adequately proven psychological research has shown that
human beings have very limited ability to observe, recall, or describe
events as they really happen. His second proposition is that this
limited ability results in a faulty process which in turn is exaggerated
by the adversary trial system. He concludes that evidence as accepted
under our rules of admission is often unrelated to reality, and makes
a farce of one ideal of justice, namely, to arrive at truth.'
1 It is possible of course to argue that the purpose of a trial is never really a search
for truth since truth is an abstraction and is only meaningful as relative to the infor-
mation at hand. Truth is constrained by the limitations of the media through which
it is communicated. A trial is a process for arriving at a fair and orderly determination
of the issues in accordance with what data is available. This may be a very limited
construction indeed. Truth as an ideal of justice is one thing, while the ordering
of facts to permit a socially acceptable decision is another.
[Vol. 4
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We are often witness to the fact that in the adversary trial game
the craftsman-advocate emerges triumphant in the contest, not be-
cause truth is on his side, but by virtue of his having successfully
manipulated the psychologically unsophisticated minds of the triers
of fact so that they identify with him and hence his client on an emo-
tional rather than a factual or legal basis. We are all familiar with
this type of trial technique, and must surely concede that many of the
great personalities of trial work have utilized it. The charismatic
mystique which surrounds the successful practitioner with this skill
increases the momentum of success. The news media may accelerate
the "build-up" of mystique simply because the figure is newsworthy.
However, Mr. Marshall complains not so much about the trial
attorney himself, who, after all, is simply a product of the system,
but the system itself.
Testimony is constantly dissected and contradicted and reshaped
toward partisan ends. That is the essence of a trial; it is not a
scientific or philosophical quest for some absolute truth, but a bitter
proceeding in which evidence is cut into small pieces, distorted and
reconstructed imperfectly in summation (p. 94).
I do not think that Mr. Marshall means to suggest that the factual
reality cannot be subjected to rigorous investigation and analysis.
Rather, he is saying that the trial process, as we know it now, not
only obfuscates the relationships between cause and effect, but
generally blurs an understanding of the context in which the given
action takes place. Moreover, the whole process of "noticing" is
treated by most people, many psychiatrists included, as if it were a
simple absolute when in fact it is a variable and complex process.
In fact, the individual perceptive-apperceptive-response process is as
unique as the fingerprints of the person who does the "noticing." Any
perception suffers the consequence of being filtered through an im-
perfect associational process and "osterized" into the matrix of the
observer's previous experience. While this may seem an overstate-
ment, scientific research data does support this conclusion.
This point, once granted, raises the question as to whether it ever
really serves the ends of justice to fragment complicated animate
transactions and to try to reduce them to fundamentals for the pur-
pose of classification. For instance, we might inquire whether a
mechanistic approach to analyzing the mental state of an accused
person (the usual approach generally trying to describe this state in
progressively reductive terms) can ever really result in a full under-
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standing of that person in a dynamic relationship to his circumstances.
It may be that such attempts are only rituals that provide absurdly
reductive criteria that often mislead despite their cloak of "scientific"
accuracy. They become steps by which one rationalizes as "just" or
"scientific" a classification which is in fact purely arbitrary. At least
this approach does dispose of the offender on a right-wrong basis in
accordance with a bias previously established by the psychological set
of the trier of fact and the judge. On the other hand, it is possible for
the criminal act to be properly described in terms of the psychological
transaction of the "offender" with his society. Of course, this trans-
action can only be understood from the history of the accused and
when the act is viewed according to the context of circumstances
in which it took place. The label applied to the person is irrelevant
to his understanding and is often prejudicial to a reasonable dis-
positive process.
The factors which shape the offender's judgment in giving vent to
an antisocial impulse or in taking an action at a given point in time
is in fact germane to taking a proper corrective action. This should be
no mere "cause-effect" simple stimulus-response equation, but rather
an attempt to understand the event as a transactional sequence within
the global context of its occurrence. Many persons adopt the point of
view that it is sufficient to simply reach a judgment that such and
such form of behavior is approved of, and therefore good, and such
and such form of behavior is disapproved of, and therefore bad. But
that act of so classifying the behavior does not generally solve the
social problem. Ultimately, it must fall to someone to reach a fair
and mature judgment as to the most socially constructive disposition
of the offender. While the easiest form of disposition of the detri-
mental or the unwanted is to destroy it, when the unwanted or detri-
mental is human life there must be second thoughts as to what the
psychological and emotional impact of such action has on the rest of
society. Is it the proper function of a trial, for instance, to try to bring
before the court all of the material which may be relevant to the best
possible sentence, over and beyond the question of guilt and in-
nocence, once that categorization has been made? If that is so, then
in understanding the experimential matrix of criminals we have a
legitimate area of inquiry for the courts' attention. As John Dewey
has said: "Until we know the conditions which have helped form the
characters we approve and disapprove our efforts to create the one
and do away with the other will be blind and halting."'
2 DEwEy, HumAN NATURE AND CONDUCT (Modem Library ed. 1930).
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While it is true that understanding in many areas of psychiatry
and psychology are cloudy, speculative or moot, there is a valuable
body of knowledge already available fox profitable study by lawyers
and jurists. I should like to submit that it may be just as pertinent for
the student of law to learn something about the complex nature of
the human's perception-cognitive psychobiological systems, and about
the individual and group psychosocial dynamics as it is for the
medical student to learn something of the microscopic nature, func-
tion, and pathology of the tissues and organs and systems, the dis-
order of which ultimately expresses itself as physical disease.
Mr. Marshall's book focuses on one such area. His comments on
perception form the most significant portion of the first chapter. In
fact, his exposition of data about the perceptive process variables
is as good a brief summary of pertinent comments as I have ever
encountered. Furthermore, this summari is developed in a way which
makes it readily understood by students of law who may have never
had significant education in the areas of psychology. The reading of
this chapter, or something similar to it, in my opinion, should be
required reading by every enlightened teacher of a course in evidence.
One may question whether the present state of our knowledge
about perception is sufficiently advanced to permit practical applica-
tion in legal contexts. The answer can only be an emphatic "yes"!
Psychology is an intricately partitioned field. While some areas of it
have been relatively neglected or only roughly surveyed, some sec-
tions have been tilled and cultivated to a point where practical appli-
cations to other transactional social science such as jurisprudence can
now be harvested to enrich our understanding and propel social
movement forward. Perhaps no portion of the field of psychology
has been as vigorously tilled and cultivated as has this area of
perception-the complex act of "noticing."
Notice is prerequisite to testimony, and perception is a preliminary
before recall can even be attempted without fabrication. Experience
gives rise to expectations that are used to fill in the gaps between any
sensory data sequence. "Filling the gaps in perception," according to
Mr. Marshall, "is a betting process." (p. 19). He reiterates a truism
from psychoanalytic and transactional psychology when he says:
We select what we believe will be harmonious with those elements
we have perceived and repress those that will create conflicts for us.
The elements that we choose or repress will depend on what bet,
or what selection, we make as the likeliest explanation for what
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we see; and that bet will, of course, be conditioned by past ex-
perience in similar situations (p. 19). 3
In any attempt to collect a group of operative facts prerequisite to a
jural act, that perceptive-apperceptive process should be understood
and taken into account.
My own recently expanded experience with lawyers, law professors,
and law students leads me to observe that a great many of them lack
information about the process of perception and apperception, despite
the fact that such information cannot help but be needed in their
professional work. Their general state of knowledge seems hardly
adequate to the task of dealing with their clients or their students.
Moreover, if present at all, it is often constrained by the effects of
early college courses in psychology. It often appears that most of
them never passed the basic tenets of the behavioral school of psy-
chology with its rather rigid, and unfortunately all too durable
mechanistic-elementarist frame of reference. Therefore, it seems ap-
propriate for me to disgress and plead for recognition that perceptual
theory has evolved very significantly over the past few years. It does
not seem wholly out of place for me to briefly summarize its develop-
ment.
The behaviorist school of psychological theory, despite its initial
modern scientific approach, was finally characterized by a rather rigid
3 While most of us would readily accept the notion that interpretive judgments
are conditioned by the observer's experience as a human being, there will be far fewer
of us who are aware of what a varying set of constructs emerge from the reservoir
of our "remembered" experience. The correspondence between percept and object is in
fact never absolute. Even though the physico-chemical-mechanical impingement of
sensory data on our nervous systems could be identical between two persons, the
associational system on which that data is registered and from which the apperceptive
construct must emerge will vary. No two persons in life, even identical twins raised
in the same household, ever have the exact same associational system or psychological
set. Even if the immediate set is nearly identical, it is superimposed on a reservoir
of previous experience which will determine the apperceptive process. This apper-
ceptive limb of the process of noticing differs from person to person. The in-put (or
afferent limb of the perceptive process) cannot be separated from the antecedent
psychological set. The apperceptive process begins and the sensory impulse imprinted
is classified and referred amongst the millions of previously engrammed or imprinted
referrants. From the convergence of the present stimulus with this vast multiple of
complex antecedent referrants, a number of functional probabilities result. The con-
struct emerging is in fact a selective one. What are some of the factors which influence
this process detrimentally? What factors influence perception itself? What factors rein-
force recall? Can the process of recollection be subverted completely by factors which
influence the mode of articulation of the construct emerging from the percept? Is the
percept influenced by factors which should be known to the trier of fact and of law
in order that the better ends of justice may be served? Mr. Marshall's book reiterates
a whole series of factors which influence perception and recall, and should be an
invaluable aid to the student of trial technique and testimonial evidence.
(Vol. 4
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application of a linear concept between stimulus and response. While
this was an accurate concept in simple, isolated forms (such as a
two-neuron afferent-efferent spinal arc, an example of which would
be tapping the knee tendon to elicit a reflex contraction of the muscles
supplied by that segment of the spinal cord) this linear stimulus-
response concept is revealed to be a serious over-simplification when
the number of neurons between the afferent and efferent (receiver-
effector) limbs of the arc is increased as it is in any mental process.
Each intervening nerve cell interposed connects with other receiver-
effector units as well as other intervenors. This increases the com-
plexity and widens the number of variable responses. Ignoring this
factor, the early oversimplified reduction led to a predominantly
structural and mechanical orientation of perceptual theory. This
oversimplified concept had the effect of creating an inference that one
stimulus registered to create one direct response which was a straight
line response to it and involved nothing more, and could be "objec-
tively" observed. In fact, such a simple S-R seldom, if ever, occurs in
nature; and, "objective" observations depend on the circumstances.
As time passed, behaviorism, despite its durable effect, gave way to
the Gestaltists.
The Gestalt school of psychology took a broader view of the con-
figurational field of forces acting to influence the individual observed.
This was an improvement over the simple linear S-R explanation and
was accurate except that its phenomenological analysis left out the
observer as being part of the process. And as Willian Stein so pithily
put it, "there is no Gestalt without a Gestalter." While as attorneys,
members of the jury, judges, or examining experts, we would like to
think we are objective observers, the operations of a variety of con-
figurations of psychological field forces is being applied to the case
before us, which induces rather different albeit automatic or con-
ditioned responses in each of us. The presentation of the case is a
stimulus impinging on our own previous perceptual framework. We
see the process through the matrix of our own experiential bias.
Hence, we in turn cling to the familiar and avoid the unfamiliar, or
distort it to fit into our own perceptual framework, filling gaps,
making the "bets" as to what transpired in accordance with our own
experience.
While the Gestaltists did give some attention to individual differ-
ences and subjective factors as past experience, the effects of these
differences were generally played down. While the theory says that
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what we see is the product of interaction between external forces set
up by stimuli from the object, and autonomous internal forces in the
brain itself, the concept tends to minimize the fact that there must be,
in addition, some basis for (1) the observer's "choosing" one pattern
or set of facts from the infinity of external stimuli impinging on the
sensory receptors and (2) for the construct we arrive at from that
particular sensory in-put.
This is to say that there are all manner of things simultaneously
impinging on some aspect of the neural receptive system-acting to
elicit adjustive and alerting mechanisms in order to preserve our
physiological and emotional equilibrium. Most of the percepts im-
pinging are outside the focus of conscious awareness, yet are easily
brought into focus. The focus of conscious "perceptive attention"
shifts with the degree of dominance, for example, the importance the
subject of the signal has had for us in our past experience. There will
be an "alerting" response to some of these signals while other signals
which have been assigned as incidental are ignored until attention is
focused upon them'
For the school of social and psychiatric thought called the trans-
actionalists, the act of perception has come to be understood as a
selective and dynamic function of the total personality. Perception is
viewed as an ongoing process or transaction through which the in-
dividual relates himself to his world and which in turn relates itself
to him. An accumulation of experiments and observations has
confirmed what common sense might seem to testify; perception is
not an automatic and discriminant response to stimuli, but is highly
conditioned by the matrix of experience which conditions the "set" of
the "perceiver." This is equally true whether we are dealing with a
psychologist observer, a witness, a juryman or a judge. He will be
more receptive to "noticing" material which resonates with material
he believes he already knows or which tends to affirm what he be-
lieves most likely from his own limited frame of reference.
4 A simple example of this is easily demonstrated. As you begin to read this you
have been "unaware" of the sensations from your right big toe, but as you read the
words you become aware of some of the sensations that were present and registering
on your neuro-receptors all along. The mention of the right big toe affected your im-
mediate psychological set and created a shift in perceptive attention to an area that
otherwise would have remained remote or subordinated. You choose to exercise your
will to focus-or again, as an incident of your own psychological set involving your
attitude toward the subject read, or the author writing, your reaction was quite
different, perhaps even negativistic or contentious. In any event your response validates




Thus we see that perception of a crime, of testimony, or of a
witness' demeanor is a highly selective affair. This selective attention,
in turn, implies the existence of a corollary-"selective inattention,"5
that is the capacity of the individual to ignore, reject, transform, and
generally reconstruct the material of his experience entirely uncon-
sciously, without ever having to resort to the method of conscious
denial and pervarication. This is no rare phenomenon. I venture to
say it is the rare counselor who, in working with a client, has not
become aware of that person's inattention to some comment or in-
terpretation. Investigation generally reveals that this material was
selectively dosed out because it was dissonant or contrary to the
belief the client needed at that particular time. I suspect that since
the process is not unique to the psychotherapeutic interview that it
occurs just as regularly in the attorney-client relationship. The in-
dividual's motives, needs, attitudes, emotions, the general state of his
psychology, and the effects of past experience will all seem to pre-
dispose the individual's expectancies. It follows that these factors
determine the quality of our reactivity as well as its degree. The
expectations will effect his choice and in turn, his choice may set in
motion mechanics of discharge which are potentially far reaching.
Perhaps in no case does the chain of consequences extend further
than when the individual is in a judgmental role, whether as trier of
fact, or maker or enforcer of laws.
It is into the richness of these fields that Mr. Marshall's book leads
the way. There is a wealth of psychological information gleaned from
a scholarly study of the research sources. The material in the first
chapter and introduction should be mandatory reading for any stu-
dent of evidence. The last chapter, which deals with the application of
his thesis to the courtroom situation, is rich in psychological concepts
which, if practically applied, cannot help but win trials, despite the
possible contrary merits of the opponent's case. As Mr. Marshall
aptly points out:
A trial lawyer is probably most successful if he introduces the con-
tradictions, inaccuracies, or falsifications of the opposing witnesses,
or the weakness of his opponent's interpretation, after he has estab-
lished a supportive relationship between himself and the jury...
(p.8S).
The jury is persuaded by his arguments only after he has succeeded
in getting the jurymen to identify with him as a person.
5 The process was first so described by the late Harry Stack Sullivan, M.D., one of
the most progressive thinkers of the neo-analytic school of psychiatry.
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The middle of the book, entitled "Some Vagaries of Recall," is
weak, but it is weak through no major fault of the author. It is weak
because there is only a limited amount of material available to report,
which has been derived from specific experiments structured to paral-
lel or duplicate the elements of the testimonial or judicial process. Per-
haps any law school classroom could become a laboratory for demon-
strating some of these precepts and concepts, and perhaps this will
be a teaching-research direction in the future. Certainly Mr. Marshall
outlines some interesting problem areas to which research attention
might be turned with excellent results. The critical and analytic
faculties of the law student could be honed to a greater keenness and
an expanded consciousness of operational elements not only within
his own "Gestalt" which he may have heretofore ignored, but to the
transactional significance of the client's interaction with his environ-
ment as well.
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